In a quantal response equilibrium (QRE), players are assumed boundedly rational and observe noisy evaluations of the strategies values. In a 2 × 2 bimatrix game, player i will choose the first strategy if and only if
Quantal response equilibrium
In a quantal response equilibrium (QRE), players are assumed boundedly rational and observe noisy evaluations of the strategies values. In a 2 × 2 bimatrix game, player i will choose the first strategy if and only if
where u ij denotes the payoff of player i using strategy j and ε ij denotes the observation noise on the strategy. In this case, best response function becomes probabilistic rather than deterministic. Suppose that player i's noise vector, ε i = (ε i1 , ε i2 ), is distributed according to a joint distribution with density function p i (ε i ), player i then adopts his first strategy with probability
where σ ij (u i1 , u i2 ) is called the quantal response function.
The most common specification of QRE is the logit equilibrium. The logistic quantal response function is written as
This arises from Eq.(S2) if all the noises follow the extreme value distribution with cumulative distribution function exp(− exp(−λε − γ)), where γ is Euler's constant. Therefore, if each player uses a logistic quantal response function, the corresponding logit equilibria are solutions of
where π i = π i1 denotes the probability of player i using his first strategy. For the mini ultimatum game (1), Eq.(S4) is written as
where
Limiting logit equilibrium
Denote the set of QRE at noise level λ by G λ . When λ = 0, Eq.(S5) has a unique
)}, and when λ → +∞, QRE set consists of three Nash equilibria
We will show that for almost all mini ultimatum games, G includes a unique branch which starts for λ = 0 at (
) and converges to one of the Nash equilibria (0, 0) and (1, In order to show the structure of G, we look at the projection of Eq.(S5) on π 1 − π 2 plane. Notice that
the projection is written as ) and ( 
Theorem S1
For almost all mini ultimatum games, the graph of Eq.(S7) consists of two (disjoint) branches, where one passes through the Nash equilibrium (1, q) and the other passes through the centroid ( ). For the critical case, two branches intersect at a singular point.
Proof:
Without loss of generality, suppose 0 < q < , and study the graph of Eq.(S7) in each region. Clearly, Eq.(S7) has no solution in regions (2), (3), and (6). Furthermore, λ > 0 in regions (1) and (4), and λ < 0 in region (5). (See Supporting Information Figure S2) We next analyze the shape of solution curves in regions (1), (4) and (5) by the implicit function theorem. Define
and S 22 ≥ 0 if
Hence, in region (1), S(π 1 , π 2 ) = 0 is an increasing curve from (0, 0) to ( ). On the other hand, in region (4), we have S 11 ≤ 0 and S 22 ≥ 0, i.e., S is a concave function of π 1 and a convex function of π 2 . This implies that for givenπ 2 , S(π 1 , π 2 ) = 0 has (a) two solutions (π From Theorem S1, the LLE is (0, 0) (or (1, ) to it.
In the critical case, two branches intersect at a singular point (π * 1 , π * 2 ) and tracing the branch of QRE correspondence beginning at the centroid could reach all three Nash equilibria. In this case, we have S(π
